Tax Incentives for Retirement Savings: Simulation Results in the Presence of Liquidity Constraints and Heterogeneous Consumers in an OLG-GE Model by Rodrigo Cifuentes et al.
415
I gratefully acknowledge the excellent comments by discussants Solange
Berstein and Salvador Valdés-Prieto. Of course, all remaining errors are my own.
General Equilibrium Models for the Chilean Economy, edited by Rómulo
Chumacero and Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel, Santiago, Chile. © 2005 Central Bank of Chile.
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The overlapping generations general equilibrium (OLG-GE)
framework constitutes an important tool for policy evaluation. One
of its strengths is that it considers that at any given time the
population is composed of workers of different ages and, therefore,
whith different time horizons. This has two advantages. First, the
assumption of a realistic distribution of time horizons and budget
constraints among the population allows the analyst to realistically
model the evolution of the equilibrium path of the economy given a
certain policy. Second, modeling the different generations in detail
supports making meaningful welfare comparisons across generations.
These advantages make the framework attractive for policy
evaluation, since it can help determine cohort-based compensatory
policies that may be crucial for making a certain policy feasible.
This paper uses an OLG-GE model to assess the impact of the
recently approved tax incentive mechanisms for retirement savings in
Chile. The purpose is to determine the extent to which different groups
of workers may take advantage of the incentives, the potential
aggregate impact in the steady state, the transition path of the economy
to the new steady state, and the welfare implications of the reform.416 Rodrigo Cifuentes
The OLG-GE framework is particularly attractive for studying
this reform because the reform triggers more than one transition.
One is a transition in individual savings decisions. The fact that
workers are at different stages in their life cycle implies that the
final aggregate impact on capital accumulation will arise only when
all living generations have faced the same conditions during their
working lives. The second is an important fiscal transition. Taxes are
deferred, which means that the public sector will have to make some
kind of transitory adjustment until income tax collection returns to a
stationary level.
The model used in this paper incorporates two important
improvements with regard to previous versions, which are crucial
for the problem at hand. First, it models an income tax structure
with increasing marginal rates. Solving the consumption and savings
problem in this context provides new insights into the impact of
income taxes on savings. Moreover, it is crucial for the model to
provide a realistic prediction of the impact of tax incentives on
savings behavior. Second, the population is modeled with
heterogeneity in income levels. This provides the necessary
environment for welfare evaluation, since the benefits of the policy
under study vary with income level.
The paper is organized as follows. The first section introduces
the tax incentive mechanism recently approved in Chile for
voluntary savings for retirement. Section 2 describes the model
and section 3 its parameterization. Section 4 presents partial
equilibrium results, showing optimal policies for voluntary savings
for different agents. Steady-state comparisons are presented in
section 5, while section 6 shows the results for the transitions. A
final section summarizes the main findings and presents paths for
future work.
1. TAX INCENTIVE MECHANISMS FOR VOLUNTARY SAVINGS
FOR RETIREMENT (VSR)
The incentive mechanism consists of allowing a deduction from
the income tax base equal to the savings for retirement made during
a year up to a maximum. These savings can only be accessed at
retirement, at which time the withdrawals are subject to income
tax. Withdrawals take the form of either annuities or monthly
pension payments. In the latter case, the amount of the payments417 Tax Incentives for Retirement Savings
is determined via the phased withdrawal rules that apply to normal
pensions, which try to secure a constant pension throughout
retirement. In addition, a certain amount can be withdrawn tax-
free in lump-sum payments, provided that the monthly pension is
above a certain level.
An incentive scheme like this has been in place in Chile since the
current pension system was implemented in 1981. A reform
implemented in March 2002 introduced the following changes to the
scheme:
— Maximum monthly voluntary contributions were raised from
48 UF to 50 UF a month;1
— Tax-free withdrawals after retirement were limited to 2,100 UF 2
(there was no limit before the reform);
— Withdrawals before retirement were allowed, subject to a penalty
of 3 percent of the withdrawal plus one-tenth of the marginal
income tax rate that corresponds to the income level of the
worker (the penalty thus varies between a minimum of 3 percent
and a maximum of 7.3 percent);
— The type of institution allowed to provide the service was expanded
to include banks and insurance companies; and
— Providers were allowed to charge a fee.
Taken at face value, the effect of the legal changes on the amount
of voluntary savings is ambiguous. The limit on tax-free withdrawals
and the provider fee have a direct adverse pecuniary effect that makes
VSR less attractive, whereas the higher monthly contributions and
the possibility of early withdrawal make the mechanism more
attractive (although the change in contributions is small and early
withdrawal does not generate a direct pecuniary effect).
The crucial point of the legal modification, however, is that
competition for VSR is now open to new players. These new entities
can be expected to undertake a large marketing effort to encourage
workers to participate in the system. Recent findings show that
long-term savings are highly sensitive to framing and arrangements
that reduce transaction costs (Choi and others, 2001). Marketing efforts
should help to place retirement savings on the “path of least
resistance”, expanding the use of existing programs.
1. The Unidad de Fomento (UF) is a CPI-indexed unit of account widely used
in the financial sector in Chile. It varies daily.
2. Limit is defined as 1,200 Unidades Tributarias Mensuales (UTM), another
CPI-indexed unit of account, which varies monthly. 1 UTM = 1.75 UF approximately.418 Rodrigo Cifuentes
2. THE MODEL
The base model is the OLG-GE model with credit constraints
developed by Cifuentes and Valdés-Prieto (1997) which, in turn, is
an expanded version of Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987). The main
difference with the latter is that Cifuentes and Valdés-Prieto model
the case of liquidity constraints. This is extremely important for the
present case. In the absence of liquidity constraints, savers would
take advantage of the full tax incentive, without considering
preferences for consumption. Consumption would be maximized
independently with total wealth as the only input. Liquidity
constraints prevent this: the extent to which the tax advantage is
used depends on both the income profile and time preferences.
The model has three sectors: households, firms, and the
government. Households are endowed with an age-related path of
units of labor. In this paper, I further consider three different types
of household, according to the level of education attained by the head.
Different levels of educational attainment imply different levels of
productivity, so this is modeled as different amounts of labor units.
Households accumulate savings that are offered to the
productive sector (firms) as capital and to the government as
demand for bonds. This means that households own all the factors
in the economy, and capital is owned homogeneously among
households of similar characteristics. Firms demand factors with
a profit-maximizing objective. Government, in turn, must finance
expenditures through taxes and public debt issuances. There is no
uncertainty of any sort in the model, and agents are assumed to
have perfect foresight.
2.1 Households
Households are assumed to have an economically active life of
sixty years, which represents a worker who offers labor in the
market between ages twenty-one and sixty-five and is retired from
age sixty-six through death at age eighty. The supply of labor
typically increases with age or presents a hump shape, as a result
of the effects of experience on productivity for different types of
worker. The section on calibration shows the particular profiles
for labor productivity used in this paper.
Factor prices and labor endowment are given. Each type of
household maximizes a constant intertemporal elasticity of419 Tax Incentives for Retirement Savings
substitution (CIES)—or constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)—utility
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and where δ  is the discount rate or time preference parameter, γ is
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (or the inverse of the
coefficient of risk aversion), a indicates age, t represents
chronological time, e is education level, and a1 is the age at which
the consumer is maximizing.
Equation (2) is the budget constraint in flow terms.
e
at F indicates
the stock of financial assets at the end of period t,
e
at l is the labor supply,
wt is the wage rate at year t,
e
a c is net consumption, τ  y and τ  c are
income tax and value-added tax (VAT) rates, respectively, τ ss is the
social security contribution rate, and
e
at p is the pension benefit. As





ta p − , which means that the pension does
not depend on age, but on the cohort to which the worker belongs.420 Rodrigo Cifuentes
Equation (3) imposes credit constraints by requiring that financial
assets can not be negative. Equation (4) indicates that workers do not
own assets at the beginning of their working life.
Choices regarding consumption and saving plans are time consistent
throughout the worker’s life. This means that if maximization were to
be revised later in life, the consumer would chose to stick to the original
plan. Each worker thus optimizes only once, with a1 = 21. However,
optimization may change in the face of unanticipated changes in the
evolution of the workers’ environment. In this case, all agents have to
re-optimize at the moment of the reform, and the optimization can be
based on starting assets greater than zero.
The maximization problem so defined implies that households have
perfect knowledge of factor prices and tax rates from the age at which
they maximize until the end of life. The outcome of the maximization
is a path of household consumption, asset holdings, and taxes paid.
Finally, I define the evolution of mandatory retirement assets, A, as
() 1, 1 1
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2.2 Aggregation
To move from individual data to aggregate macroeconomic variables,
I sum across all individuals alive at a given time, t. This implies summing
across age and educational levels. I assume that population grows at an
annual rate of n percent. Aggregate supply of capital in year t is
() ()
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In equilibrium, capital supply should equal capital demand by the
productive sector plus total public debt, which is the demand for capital
by the public sector.
Total labor supply is the sum of labor endowments of workers of
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In contrast with capital, labor supply is fixed. Factor prices adjust
until full employment of labor is reached. The implicit assumption
with regard to productivity growth is that each generation is born
with a profile of labor endowments that is x percent higher than the
previous generation for every age. This introduces productivity
growth, in that it benefits only new generations that join the labor










+ =+ for all a, e, and t.
2.3 Firms
Firms use a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) technology
to produce. They maximize profits taking factor prices as given, as
described in the following expression:
() ()
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 , (8)
where the subscript t has been dropped from the expression for
simplicity, since all variables refer to the same time, t ; σ  represents
the elasticity of substitution in production; and φ  is the depreciation
rate. First-order conditions of maximization imply that factors are









Factor demands can be obtained from the first-order conditions:
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2.4 Government
Government must finance exogenously given expenditures. This
can be done by issuing debt or imposing taxes. By definition, the
balanced budget implies
1 tt t t t t Gr BTB B + += +− ,
where Gt is total government expenditures, Bt is the outstanding public
debt, and Tt is the tax collection, which equals
()
yc
tt t t t t t t t Tw L r F p c =+ + τ + τ ,
where Ft is total voluntary assets held at time t, pt represents total
pension payments at time t, and ct is aggregate net consumption at















The no-Ponzi-game condition implies that the present value of
taxes should equal the present value of expenditure plus the initial
stock of debt. This condition implies that the growth rate of debt
cannot exceed the interest rate.
In practice, for a given path of public expenditures, fiscal budget
can be balanced by an infinite number of combinations of paths for
public debt and each of the taxes. In this paper I assume that public
debt and income tax rates are fixed ex ante by rules and that the
VAT rate is adjusted to attain equilibrium in fiscal budget. In particular,
I assume that public debt is fixed as percentage of GDP. This
guarantees that the no-Ponzi-game condition is always satisfied. The
income tax schedule follows a rule that is described in the next section.
2.5 Equilibrium
Equilibrium is found using a Gauss-Siedel algorithm. The first
step is to conjecture an initial path for the level of the aggregate
stock of capital (
D
t K ). Given that the path for labor (Lt ) is known and
fixed, paths for factor prices (r and w) consistent with the conjecture423 Tax Incentives for Retirement Savings
can be derived using equations (9) and (10). A path for the parameter
that balances the fiscal budget is also conjectured. Given these paths,
households decide consumption and savings. Individual variables are
aggregated to determine capital supply and the level of the variable
that adjusts the public sector finances. The equilibrium delivers new
values for the conjectured variables. If these new values are the same
as the initial conjecture, then an equilibrium has been found. This
typically is not the case in the first rounds. When magnitudes differ,
a new conjecture is used to simulate the model, typically a path
between the previous conjecture and the previous outcome of the
model. A solution is found after a few iterations. In formal terms, the
equilibrium condition I am looking for is
DS
ttt KB K +=  for all t,
which says that capital demanded in the economy, from the
production side (
D




In the case of a transition, the algorithm is the same except that
convergence is assumed to reach a maximum 180 years after the
introduction of the reform that triggered the transition. This
involves assuming that all relevant prices in the economy are fixed
from that year on at the value they reach that year. This assumption
is usually not binding, since the economy typically converges in
shorter time spans.
3. PARAMETERS
This section presents the parametrization of the model, with
special attention to the tax scheme and the income profiles. It also
discusses the strategy followed to determine the optimal savings policy
in the presence of tax incentives for retirement savings.
3.1 Tax Scheme
Previous versions of the model consider single-rate income tax
schemes. The incentive mechanisms under study here, however, have
their greatest impact with income tax schemes in which the marginal
tax rate increases with income, as is the case of Chile. This paper
models the Chilean income tax structure (see table 1).424 Rodrigo Cifuentes
Incorporating this tax scheme has two implications for the model.
First, the government budget is adjusted via the consumption or value-
added tax. Adjusting marginal income tax rates introduces noise with
regard to the object of study, which is precisely the fact that the effective
marginal income tax rate can be changed through retirement savings.
If I allowed the tax scheme to change over time in order to adjust the
government budget, I would not be able to measure the additional
savings generated by the tax incentive.
The second implication is more troublesome. In a context of
productivity growth, keeping the income tax scheme of table 1 constant
over time implies that the economy will only reach a stationary
equilibrium when the entire population is in the highest income
bracket. Consequently, a model economy will be in a very long
transition path until this happens. Such a simulation is feasible, but
it is highly intensive in computational capacity—and the main
question is whether it is a meaningful exercise. In such a transition,
distortions increase over time as the median marginal income tax
rate increases (and the VAT or other tax rates decreases if the size of
the government is to be kept constant). Income tax becomes the main
source of revenue for the government.
That context clearly is not a reasonable scenario for policy
evaluation. Agents in the economy will not allow the level of distortions
to follow whatever path the dynamics of growth might determine. A
more sensitive scenario is to assume that a decision has been made
about the level of distortions that agents in the economy find optimal
Table 1. Income Tax Rates in Chile, 2002
Income range Marginal tax rate








262.5 and over 43
Source: Internal Revenue Service.
a. Tax brackets are defined in UTMs in the tax code. Here they are presented in UFs to facilitate
presentation.425 Tax Incentives for Retirement Savings
and then to keep that level of distortions constant, except for the
consequences of the specific tax reform under study.
The practical way to keep the level of distortions constant is to
adjust the threshold of each income tax bracket increase in line with
productivity in the economy. Each generation will face the same
scheme in relative terms, and a stationary equilibrium can be attained.
While such adjustments do not occur on a yearly basis in reality, the
strategy adopted here seems to provide a reasonable assumption
regarding medium- and long-run tax policy dynamics.
3.2 Income Profiles
Recent studies on the effects of age on income include Larrañaga
and Paredes (1999) and Butelmann and Gallego (2001). The former
paper estimates an average age-income profile using synthetic
cohorts from a long series of panels (1957 to 1996) from the
employment survey in Greater Santiago. Having data for various
years allows them to isolate cycle effects properly. This profile is
longitudinal, that is, it represents the income profile faced by
individuals or cohorts throughout their lifetime. Butelmann and
Gallego (2001), in turn, report cross-sectional age-income profiles.
In principle, longitudinal profiles can be derived from cross-sectional
ones based on assumptions about the evolution of productivity growth
between generations. However, longitudinal profiles cannot be
derived from the Butelmann-Gallego data using reasonable
assumptions of productivity growth. This may be due to the fact
that year effects affect their estimates.
Butelmann and Gallego (2001) report profiles for different levels
of educational attainment, while Larrañaga and Paredes (1999)
derive only one profile representing the population average.
Assuming that year effects do not substantially affect the relative
differences in income across workers with different educational
attainment, I can use Butelmann and Gallego (2001) profiles to derive
income profiles by educational attainment from Larrañaga and
Paredes (1999). I determine this by imposing the condition that at
every age, income levels for the three income categories have to
keep the relative distances found in Butelmann and Gallego (2001),
while averaging the level of Larrañaga and Paredes (1999). Weights
are reported in Butelmann and Gallego (2001).
Figure 1 shows the income profile thus derived. The income
profile of the worker with the lowest level of education never426 Rodrigo Cifuentes
reaches the first income bracket with positive income tax. This
implies that tax incentives for VSR will never be relevant for this
group. In fact, they can only reduce welfare for this group, since
these workers do not obtain any benefit from the tax incentives
and the lower liquid income at working ages may heighten financial
constraints. Population shares of different groups by educational
attainment are as follows: incomplete primary school: 53.2 percent;
complete high school: 25.2 percent; and complete superior
education: 21.6 percent.
3.3 Other Parameters
Table 2 shows the value used in the simulations of the other
variables of the model. Data on public debt and public expenditure
are Chile averages for the period 1993–2000. Public debt considers
Central Bank long-term debt plus recognition bonds. It is not
relevant for the model whether the issuer is the Treasury or the
Central Bank, as in Chile. What is captured by the model is the
crowding-out effect of public debt on investment, and this effect
occurs independently of the issuer.
Figure 1. Income Profiles by Level of Educational
Attainmenta
Source: Author’s calculations based on Butelman and Gallego (2001) and Larrañaga and Paredes (1999).
a. Based on monthly income in 2001.427 Tax Incentives for Retirement Savings
Table 2. Simulation Parameters
Variable Value
Public debt over GPD 19.6 percent
Public expenditure over GPD 17.6 percent
Contribution rate to mandatory pension fund 5 percent
Production function (CES)
Sigma 0.8 and 1.2
Alfa 0.53 and 0.75
Time preference 1, 3, and 10 percent
Intertemporal elasticity of substitution 0.9
Population growth rate 1 percent
Source: Central Bank of Chile and author’s estimates.
3. The accumulation of large balances in individual accounts can be avoided
through early retirement. This can easily be included in the model.
With regard to public expenditure, what is relevant for the model
is the part that is financed with taxes. This provides the measure of
the government’s impact on the budget constraints of private economic
agents. Thus, public expenditures financed by means other than taxes
(such as return on assets, asset sales, and income from public
companies) is treated as part of the private economy in this model.
The mandatory contribution to pension funds is assumed to be
5 percent. The mandatory level in Chile is actually 10 percent, but
because the model assumes a worker starts working at the age of
twenty-one and contributes continuously until he/she is sixty-five,
the amount accumulated in the personal account is usually very large.
The model does not consider more realistic features of contribution
histories, such as periods of unemployment, independent employment,
or absence from the labor force, as it is not the purpose of the model
to incorporate such features. Instead, their relevant impact on lifetime
budget constraints is fully captured via a lower contribution rate.3
The parameters of the production function are chosen to generate
a reasonable macroeconomic environment. Sigma captures the elasticity
of substitution in production in the CES function; this is chosen in the
vicinity of 1, the Cobb-Douglas case. Alpha, in turn, is set to generate a
share of labor in GDP between 66 and 68 percent, which is an
appropriate value for the Chilean economy. Finally, among the
combinations of sigma and alpha that match this requirement, I choose
those that generate a real interest rate around 5 percent, a reasonable
benchmark for returns on long-term savings.428 Rodrigo Cifuentes
3.4 Simulation Strategy
Tax incentives affect the consumer’s maximization problem
because wealth increases if income is transferred from periods with
high marginal tax to periods with low marginal tax. The practical
implication of this is that the income profile and the path of taxes
cease to be exogenous and become a consequence of workers’ savings
decisions. This would not be a problem in the absence of borrowing
constraints: workers would take full advantage of the tax benefit, and
the resulting shape of the income profile would not have any material
consequence, since workers would be able to follow any consumption
stream they wanted. In other words, tax incentives would only have
a wealth effect. In the presence of credit constraints, however,
reallocations of income along the lifecycle can have important welfare
effects if they change the extent to which credit constraints are
binding. The combination of credit constraints and an endogenous
income profile sets up a problem that is difficult to solve in a general
way in the context of the Auerbach and Kotlikoff framework. A general
solution can be found by modeling a dynamic programming problem
as in Cifuentes (2000). Within the Auerbach and Kotlikoff framework,
a good approximation to the solution can be found simplifying the
space of possibilities available to the worker and selecting the optimal
consumption and savings paths by numerical search. The simplifying
assumptions are the following:
— Active life (twenty-one to sixty-five years of age) is divided into
five periods of nine years each. I assume that the savings rate in
voluntary retirement savings mechanisms is constant within each
of these periods.
— Saving rates in voluntary retirement savings mechanisms are
restricted to values that are multiples of 2.5 percentage points.
— Withdrawals take the form of annuities. This is reasonable
considering that the optimal strategy should be similar to this.
Withdrawing funds all at once triggers higher marginal tax rates.
— Strategies that consider withdrawal of funds from voluntary
retirement savings accounts before retirement are discarded a
priori. In a context of perfect certainty about income levels,
withdrawing voluntary retirement savings before retirement would
make sense only if income in some future period is sufficiently
lower than current income such that taxes plus penalty in the future
are lower than current marginal taxes. That situation never happens
in this exercise given the shape of the income profiles used.429 Tax Incentives for Retirement Savings
4. PARTIAL EQUILIBRIUM RESULTS
This section explores the optimal use of tax incentives for
retirement for different types of agents. Given a tax structure for
income taxes, the optimal use of voluntary retirement savings
mechanisms is affected by four main factors:
— The shape of the income profile. A steep income profile implies
that liquidity constraints are strongly binding in early periods,
and the voluntary retirement savings mechanisms are less likely
to be used in those periods.
— The presence of a mandatory retirement savings program. This
is straightforward: if a portion of income is already being set aside
for retirement, with no possibility of early withdrawal of the funds,
then workers’ desire to reserve more income for the future is
reduced, despite the benefits provided through the incentives.
— Time preferences. As mentioned earlier, the presence of liquidity
constraints means that the use of the tax advantage is not
independent of preferences. A high discount rate lowers the degree
to which workers take advantage of voluntary retirement savings
mechanisms.
— Income level. Workers’ income determines their relative position
with regard to income tax brackets. This, in turn, determines the
extent to which there is a tax-arbitrage opportunity.
Figure 2 shows the optimal policy with regard to voluntary
retirement savings for the case of a worker with a complete high
school education and intertemporal preferences (δ ) of 1, 3, and 10
percent, respectively. All cases consider a 4 percent real interest rate
(net of fees). Dotted lines show the situations without the voluntary
retirement savings mechanisms.
In the case of δ  = 1 percent (figure 2.A), optimal policy consists of
a voluntary savings rate of 17.5 percent between ages of thirty-nine
to fifty-six and 15 percent between fifty-seven and sixty-five. The new
path for liquid income closely tracks the optimal consumption path.
The new consumption path is above the previous in all years starting
around the age of forty. The slope of consumption paths is not the
same throughout the life cycle because the marginal income tax rate
varies along the life cycle, changing the first-order condition for
consumption. This is clear in the consumption path without voluntary
retirement savings at the retirement age, when the marginal tax
rate goes to zero. The consumption path steepens, which is why bothSource: Author’s calculations.
a. The graphs show the case of a worker with complete high school education; the continuous line represents the
case whith voluntary retirement savings, and the dotted line, the case without it.
Figure 2. Liquid Labor Income, Consumption, and Average
Income Tax Rate Profilesa
C. Time preference (δ ): 10 percent
B. Time preference (δ ): 3 percent
A. Time preference (δ ): 1 percent431 Tax Incentives for Retirement Savings
consumption paths intersect at the end of life. The figure also shows
the average tax rate, which illustrates how taxes are reduced and a
portion of them deferred toward retirement age.
The case of δ  = 3 percent shows a lower use of voluntary
retirement savings mechanisms vis-à-vis the previous exercise (see
figure 2.B). Here optimal rates are 5 percent for ages thirty-nine to
forty-seven and 17.5 percent from forty-eight to sixty-five. The
consumption path is lower in the new situation between ages thirty-
eight and forty, but this sacrifice is compensated with larger
consumption at retirement.
Finally, figure 2.C shows the case of a worker with a high
intertemporal preference. Optimal policy is to save voluntarily for
retirement at a rate of 15 percent between ages fifty-seven and
sixty-five. Consumption is reduced between ages of fifty-five and
fifty-nine relative to the previous situation, but it then becomes
higher between the ages of seventy-five and eighty.
From the cases described above, I infer that the optimal policy
consists of taking advantage of tax incentives subject to keeping the
original consumption path attainable. This explains, for example,
the apparent paradox that the optimal savings rate for ages fifty-
seven to sixty-five is higher for the consumer with a higher discount
rate when comparing the cases of δ  = 1 percent and δ  = 3 percent. A
higher savings rate at those ages causes the original consumption
path to become unfeasible for the agent with δ  = 1 percent. This
result is not absolute, however, since very small reductions in the
consumption path can be tolerated.
Table 3 summarizes the optimal savings policy for the different
agents and time preferences. Workers with complete superior
education have their highest savings rates earlier in life than workers
with complete high school. This is a consequence of the shape of their
respective income profiles, which have a hump earlier in life for the
former worker than for the latter.
5. GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM RESULTS: THE STEADY STATE
Table 4 presents the impact of voluntary retirement savings
mechanisms on the steady state given four different parameterizations.
In all cases, the capital stock increases, with a subsequent increase
in output and fall in the interest rate. The increase in the capital
stock is higher in the cases with lower elasticity of substitution in432 Rodrigo Cifuentes
production (σ  = 0.8). In this case, capital increases on the order of 4.8
percent, while output increases 1.6 percent. In the higher elasticity
case, these figures are 2.7 percent and 0.8 percent, respectively.
In the new steady state, the VAT rate and the level of collection
of VAT and income taxes change only slightly. In the case of the
income tax, payments have been deferred from active life to
retirement. This move will make sense for a worker only if the present
value of taxes paid falls, so tax collection in the steady state should be
lower. However, labor income rises as a result of the increase in
salaries in response to higher capital accumulation. This implies that
all income profiles shift upward and are subject to higher marginal
tax rates. This is analogous to saying that the average tax rate
increases. On the capital income side, the fall in returns is
compensated with an increase in the capital stock, leaving the total
effect close to null. This is verified by the small change in the relative
share of factor income in GDP.
Summing the change in collection rates on the two taxes yields a
small reduction. This reflects the fact that the fall in the interest rate
implies lower payment for public debt, such that fewer funds need to
be collected.
Pension funds (both voluntary and mandatory) grow considerably.
Their share of total assets in the steady-state economy jumps from
50 percent to 80 percent. The increase in total capital is on the order of
Table 3. Optimal Savings Rate in Retirement Accounts with
Tax Incentives
Educational attainment Age






1 percent 0 0 17.5 17.5 15.0
3 percent 0 0  5.0 17.5 17.5
10 percent 0000 15.0
Complete superior
1 percent 0 15.0 20.0 0 0
3 percent 0  5.0 15.0  5.0  5.0











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2–3 percent, so this large increase in pension funds mainly
represents a transfer from other types of savings to these with tax
advantages.
The impact on the total amount of funds is thus considerable
despite the fact that the tax incentive mechanism is only relevant for
workers with relatively high incomes. Two caveats must be kept in
mind, however, when drawing conclusions from these numbers. First,
all the demand for assets in this economy is based on lifecycle motives,
whereas in reality, agents hold wealth with other purposes. The effects
of changes in lifecycle savings thus tend to be amplified. Second,
uncertainty may reduce incentives to voluntarily lock savings until
retirement.
6. GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM RESULTS: THE TRANSITION PATH
Transition paths reveal key features with regard to the evolution of
variables over time that are not possible to determine from steady-state
comparisons. This is particularly true when the shocks that generate
the transition take the form of changes in the tax regime or other
dimensions of fiscal policy. In the particular case studied here,
transition analysis is key to verifying that the evolution between steady
states is not monotonic.
In addition, OLG models help determine the specific welfare
change of the different generations affected by a reform. This is crucial,
since policy reforms may look very positive based on a comparison of
the steady states, but only the study of the transition will indicate
whether there are costs and if so, how they are distributed among
different groups.
The previous section showed that output is higher in the new
steady state and that income tax revenue is similar in the initial and
final steady states. Given the nature of the reform, however, income
tax should fall during the transition, such that other taxes should
rise. Transition analysis provides an indication of the magnitude of
the changes, the time it will take the economy to reach the new
steady state, and the costs that different generations must bear while
this is happening.
The results are summarized in figures 3 and 4. Figures 3 shows
the evolution of the macroeconomic equilibrium for each case of
elasticity of substitution in production and x = 0 percent. This can be
summarized by the evolution of income tax collection, which drives
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which summarizes the accumulation process and thus gives an
indication of the evolution of factor prices. The VAT rate is also shown
for completeness.
The two graphs have the same scale on the vertical axis to
facilitate comparison. Variables are shown as changes from their
initial steady-state values. Demand for capital in the case of low
elasticity of substitution in production (figure 3.A) is such that the
Figure 3. Change with Respect to Steady-state Values
Source: Author’s calculations.
A. Elasticity of substitution in production (σ  ): 0.8
B. Elasticity of substitution in production (σ  ): 1.2436 Rodrigo Cifuentes
increase in investment rates is larger than in the high elasticity
case (figure 3.B) for all the periods after the shock. This implies that
this economy moves to an equilibrium with higher capital and
therefore greater output. Income tax collection falls initially (to a
greater extent under low elasticity of substitution), but in both cases
it recovers to slightly above the initial percentage of GDP in the
final steady state. The necessary increase in the VAT rate is larger
in the case of low elasticity of substitution, rising above 1 percentage
point for 30 years.
The path of aggregate macroeconomic variables is monotonic, as
suggested by the evolution of the investment rate. These are
increasing for thirty-two to thirty-four years, and then they decline
until they converge to a level above the previous steady state by 0.55
and 0.31 percentage points in the first and second case, respectively.
Capital stock, wages, and pension funds grow monotonically between
steady states, a transition that takes fifty years.
Figure 4 shows the welfare impact of the reform for each of the
transitions studied. Each transition features three types of agent,
one for each of the educational levels considered. All three have the
same time preference of 3 percent. The welfare impact is driven by
two factors. The first is a set of macroeconomic factors, such as the
prevailing level of wages, interest rates, and taxes for a given
generation. The higher VAT of the initial years of the transition
imply lower welfare for the generations that are alive in this period,
while the higher wages that result from the increased accumulation
of capital raise the welfare of the generations born after the reform.
The second factor is the extent to which workers participate in the
tax incentive scheme. Workers who are alive in the years of higher
VAT may be able to counter this negative effect by exploiting the
tax incentive mechanism and increasing their wealth.
These two factors help explain the welfare impact shown in
figure 4. Welfare is measured in terms of equivalent variations,
which is the percentage change in lifetime consumption that is
equivalent in welfare terms to the impact of the reform. Workers
with the higher educational levels always benefit the most from
the reform, since they take advantage of the tax incentive
mechanism. The welfare differential is constant for generations
that were not in the labor force at the time of the reform. For
generations that were in the labor force at the time of the reform,
the welfare effect depends on the extent to which they use the tax
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Figure 4. Welfare: Equivalent Variations
Agents with the lowest level of education do not benefit from the
tax incentive mechanism, so they do not have any direct means of
offsetting the increased VAT. Welfare for this type of agent starts
improving when VAT rates start decreasing and capital accumulation
drives wages up. In the case depicted in figure 4.A, the welfare of this
group starts to improve with the generation that is born exactly in
the year of the reform. This generation starts its active life in the
Source: Author’s calculations.
A. Elasticity of substitution in production (σ  ): 0.8
B. Elasticity of substitution in production (σ  ): 1.2438 Rodrigo Cifuentes
twentieth year of the transition. Figure 3.A indicates that VAT rates
are at their highest twenty years after the reform and that they remain
above the steady-state level for twenty-five more years. However, at
the same time wages are higher and increasing for the next twenty-
five years, and this evolution compensates that of taxes in welfare
terms.
For workers who are over forty-five years of age at the reform,
those with complete high school are better off than those with
complete superior education. The reason for this can be seen in table
3, which shows that the former type of worker has a higher voluntary
retirement savings rate in this age group than the latter. For younger
workers (that is, those below forty-seven at the time of the reform),
the savings rate is higher for the group with complete superior
education than for the group with complete high school, and the
welfare ranking is also higher. In fact, university-educated workers
younger than forty years of age at the moment of the reform do not
suffer any loss of welfare.
7. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has shown that tax incentive mechanisms to promote
voluntary retirement savings have the potential to increase both
savings and output in the long-run equilibrium of the economy. This
change stems from a shift in the payment of income taxes from active
life to retirement. Thanks to this shift, workers can reduce the total
amount of taxes paid by reallocating income from periods in which
marginal tax rates are high to periods in which they are low. This
raises the capital accumulation in the economy. The increase in capital
prevails in the new equilibrium, while tax collection returns to its
original composition.
The increase in capital, however, has not come without a cost.
The delay in tax payments implies that other taxes will have to be
raised during a transition period. The paper shows how this burden is
distributed among groups with different income levels. The impact is
regressive, in that the lower income groups are the most affected
because they have to suffer the tax increase without being able to
exploit the new benefits of the system. In the long run, future
generations of all income levels benefit, but the groups with the highest
income levels benefit the most.
The impact on capital accumulation described in the paper is high.
This is a consequence of assumptions and features of the model that439 Tax Incentives for Retirement Savings
need to be addressed. An important assumption, for example, is that
all workers participate in the system. An alternative exploration of
the issue should incorporate independent and informal workers into
the model, which was beyond the scope of this paper.
Another important element that should be explored is the
impact of uncertainty. In the model, agents can perfectly anticipate
the tax payments generated by different paths of savings and
withdrawals, and they optimize accordingly. Uncertainty makes
this less clear. If the realization of an adverse shock makes it
necessary for workers to access the funds in their voluntary
retirement savings accounts before retirement, they will have to pay
a penalty. The tax saved on making deposits will have to be higher
than the expected penalty for early withdrawal if voluntary
retirement savings are to continue to be attractive. This implies
that voluntary retirement savings will be lower than in the certainty
case. Exploring this issue will be highly informative for assessing
the optimal conditions of access to funds before retirement.440 Rodrigo Cifuentes
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